Abstract-In this work, we evaluate aggressive undervolting, i.e., voltage scaling below the nominal level to reduce the energy consumption of Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). Usually, voltage guardbands are added by chip vendors to ensure the worst-case process and environmental scenarios. Through experimenting on several FPGA architectures, we measure this voltage guardband to be on average 39% of the nominal level, which in turn, delivers more than an order of magnitude power savings. However, further undervolting below the voltage guardband may cause reliability issues as the result of the circuit delay increase, i.e., start to appear faults. We extensively characterize the behavior of these faults in terms of the rate, location, type, as well as sensitivity to environmental temperature, with a concentration of on-chip memories, or Block RAMs (BRAMs). Finally, we evaluate a typical FPGA-based Neural Network (NN) accelerator under low-voltage BRAM operations. In consequence, the substantial NN energy savings come with the cost of NN accuracy loss. To attain power savings without NN accuracy loss, we propose a novel technique that relies on the deterministic behavior of undervolting faults and can limit the accuracy loss to 0.1% without any timing-slack overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
The power and energy dissipation of digital circuits is directly related to their supply voltage. Usually, conservative voltage guardbands are added by chip vendors to ensure the worst-case process and environmental scenarios. However, in real-world applications, these voltage margins are unnecessarily conservative and eliminating them can directly deliver significant power and energy efficiency. In recent years, it has been shown that aggressive undervolting, i.e., supply voltage underscaling below the standard nominal level can substantially improve the energy efficiency of real hardware including CPUs [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , GPUs [7] , ASICs [8] , DRAMs [9] , and SRAMs [10] . This paper extends the aggressive undervolting approach for commercial FPGAs. FPGAs are increasingly employed within the modern data centers, as expected to be in 30% of supercomputers by 2020 [11] , thanks to their massively parallel architecture and streaming execution model.
As a downside, aggressive undervolting below the voltage guardband can lead to timing related faults as the result of circuit delay increase, which can cause applications to crash or terminate with wrong results. Understanding the behavior of these faults and efficiently mitigate them can deliver further power and energy savings in low-voltage designs without performance degradation. It is worth noting that unlike Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS) technique [12] , [13] , the frequency is not scaled down in the undervolting approach, therefore energy savings can be more significant.
More concentration of this paper is on-chip memories, or Block RAMs (BRAMs) of commercial FPGAs, since BRAMs play a key role in the acceleration of state-of-the-art applications such as Neural Networks (NNs) [14] . Also, unlike many components of commercial FPGAs, the supply voltage of BRAMs can be independently regulated, which allows detailed power and reliability trade-off analysis.
To a thorough study, we perform our experiments on several representative FPGA platforms from Xilinx, a main vendor. We experimentally observe that data can be safely retrieved without any observable fault when the supply voltage is underscaled below the nominal and until a certain level, i.e., V min . V min of FPGA BRAMs is measured to be on average 39% of the nominal level. By eliminating this large voltage guardband, BRAMs power consumption is reduced more than an order of magnitude without compromising to reliability or performance. However, further voltage underscaling below V min causes faults in some locations of some BRAMs, with an exponentially increasing fault rate that varies between studied platforms.
As a case study application, we push a typical FPGAbased NN accelerator to operate under low-voltage BRAMs. In consequence, the power is significantly reduced; however, undervolting below V min the NN accuracy is reduced as the result of faults. We mitigate these faults by mapping the most reliability sensitive NN parameters to BRAM blocks that are relatively more resistant to undervolting faults.
The aim of this paper is to experimentally understand the power and reliability trade-off of commercial FPGAs under aggressive low-voltage operations and its impacts on a FPGAbased NN accelerator. The main contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
• This paper is the first effort to empirically study aggressive voltage underscaling of FPGAs below the standard nominal level. Through experimenting on four FPGA platforms, we confirm a large guardband, which is measured to be on average 39% of the nominal level for on-chip memories, slightly different among studied platforms.
• We perform the first detailed experimental bit-level characterization study of the behavior of faults when the supply voltage of FPGA on-chip memories is underscaled below the safe voltage, i.e., V min . More specifically, we observe that i) a vast majority of these faults manifest themselves as "1" to "0" bit flips, ii) the location of these faults do not change over time, iii) faults are fully nonuniformly distributed over various BRAMs, and iv) higher temperature leads to reduced fault rates, which implies lower V min at higher temperatures.
• We perform the first study of the efficiency of a NN accelerator under low-voltage FPGA operations. To attain the subsequent power saving without NN accuracy loss below V min , we present a low-overhead applicationdependent BRAMs placement technique that relies on the deterministic behavior of undervolting faults. This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we elaborate the behavior of FPGA-based BRAMs under lowvoltage operations, e.g., voltage guardband and detailed fault characterization. In Section III, we present and discuss results of the FPGA-based NN accelerator at low-voltage regimes. The previous work is reviewed in Section IV and finally, the paper is concluded and summarized, in Section V.
II. LOW-VOLTAGE OPERATIONS IN FPGA-BASED BRAMS
In this section, we present and discuss the behavior of FPGA BRAMs under aggressively low-voltage operations.
A. Experimental Methodology
Our experiments include several representative platforms from Xilinx, a main vendor, i.e., VC707 (performanceoptimized architecture) [15] , ZC702 (hardware-software architecture) [16] , and two identical samples of KC705 (poweroptimized architecture) [17] platforms. These four platforms allow us to study different architectures and also the impact of die-to-die process variation for KC705. All platforms are fabricated with 28nm technology. These platforms are composed of many components. Some of these components such as BRAMs, internal components (Look-Up Table (LUTs) and Digital Signal Processors (DSPs)), and Auxiliary I/O can be independently regulated. Among these components, we perform the first study on two voltage rails, i.e., V CCBRAM and V CCINT that supply BRAMs and tightly-coupled internal components, respectively, since these are on-chip resources. We aim to discover the minimum safe voltage, i.e., V min of those FPGA components. As can be seen in Fig. 1 , for both V CCINT and V CCBRAM , there are substantial voltage guardbands for all platforms below the nominal level (SAFE region), which is measured on average 34% and 39% for V CCINT and V CCBRAM , respectively. This voltage guardband is experimentally measured 12%, 20%, and 16% for CPUs [18] , GPUs [7] , and DRAMs [9] , respectively. Further undervolting, cause observable faults (CRITICAL region), until a voltage level at which the platforms stop operating (CRASH region). Below the V crash region, we observed that the DONE pin is unset, which at nominal levels indicates incorrect bitstream. Note that for all platforms, the nominal voltage level of both voltage rails is V nom = 1V ; however, V min and V crash slightly vary for different platforms, which can be the consequence of the architectural difference of platforms as well as the impact of process variation.
For more detailed study, we concentrate on V CCBRAM , since its independent voltage rail allows to evaluate BRAMs individually in fine-grain level at the critical voltage region, unlike the V CCINT that feeds several components such as LUTs and DSPs. Further power and reliability of the BRAMs at the critical region is discussed later in this section. BRAMs are small memory blocks that are distributed over the chip, and each basic BRAM block is a matrix of bitcells composed of rows and columns. In studied platforms the size of each basicsetup BRAM is 16 Kbits with 1024 rows and 16 columns. BRAMs can be either individually accessed or cascaded to build larger memories (with some overheads). This methodology provides flexibility for the FPGA designers to have single-cycle access to on-chip memories as per bandwidth or size needs. Detailed specifications of our tested platforms are summarized in [20] . The experimental setup of BRAMs undervolting evaluation is shown in Fig. 2 . It is composed of two distinct hardware and software components. The task of the hardware FPGA platform is to access BRAMs and transmit their content to the host, using a serial interface. In ZC702, this serial interface is controlled by the on-board Arm processor; however, in other platforms, we built our own hardware serial interface.
Note that we verify and validate that this interface is entirely reliable at any V CCBRAM level and is not affected by the BRAMs undervolting.
On the other side, the host issues the required PMBUS commands to set a certain voltage to V CCBRAM . Also, the host initializes BRAMs and analyzes potentially faulty data retrieved from BRAMs. On this setup, the reduced V CCBRAM below the minimum safe voltage, i.e., V min can cause the timing violations and in turn, corrupting some of bitcells of some of BRAMs. We follow the method shown in Listing 1 to comprehensively analyze the behavior of these faults. As explained in Listing 1, we retrieve contents of BRAMs oneby-one and within each BRAM row-by-row, and transfer them to the host. In the host, we analyze the rate and location of faults. This process is repeated 100 times for each voltage level to obtain statistically significant results. The reported results in this paper are the median of these 100 tests. After a soft reset, we gradually decrease V CCBRAM by 10mV and repeat the process until the lowest voltage that our design can operate, i.e., V crash . For each voltage level, the fault rate and power consumption of BRAMs are recorded. Finally, to measure the power consumption with acceptable accuracy, we use a power meter, while to extract the power contribution of BRAMs in the nominal voltage level, we use Xilinx Power Estimation (XPE) tool. Thus, we report total power consumption including dynamic and static, which are both directly reduced by undervolting. Note that BRAMs considered in this paper internally operate at a fixed frequency of ∼ 500mhz [21] and the whole design operates on the maximum frequency without timing violation at the nominal voltage level that is calculated by Vivado, i.e., Xilinx compiling tool.
B. Power & Reliability Trade-off of FPGA BRAMs Through Undervolting
As can be seen in Fig. 3 , our experiments on the underscaling of V CCBRAM below V nom demonstrate two thresholds. First, a voltage guardband or V min that separates the fault-free and faulty regions. Second, V crash that is the lowest level of the voltage at which our design practically operates. For all tested platforms, factory set V nom is 1V. However, through our experiments, we observe slightly different V min V and V crash among the platforms. Note that repeating these tests in more noisy and harsh environments can cause observable faults above observed V min , as well.
When underscaling V CCBRAM below V min the fault rate exponentially increases, while the power consumption significantly reduces, but with different scales for different platforms. When V CCBRAM = V min , more than an order of magnitude of power gain is achieved over V nom = 1V , without compromising on performance or reliability. As can be seen, both power consumption and reduction in KC705s are less than VC707, which is the consequence of having relatively less BRAMs as well as the inherent power optimizations adopted for KC705 by the vendor. Also, BRAMs power consumption in ZC702 is relatively less than other platforms, since it is composed of much less number of BRAMs.
Undervolting below V min , the fault rate exponentially increases, up to 652, 153, 254, and 60 per 1 Mbits (∼ 0.06%, 0.01%, 0.03%, and 0.005%) 1 at V crash , for VC707, ZC702, KC705-A, and KC705-B, respectively (with initial pattern= 16'hFFFF). As can be seen, VC707 exhibits the worst fault rate, up to 652 fault per 1 Mbit, which can be the consequence of the adopted architectural and technological performance optimization techniques, by the vendor. Also, a significant difference is observed between the two KC705 platforms, i.e., KC705-A and KC705-B. As can be seen, KC705-A shows a 4.1X higher fault rate than KC705-B, which can be due to the die-to-die process variation. Finally, ZC702 shows a fault rate of up to 153 faults per 1 Mbit. The conclusion of this experimental comparison is that the reliability degradation through aggressive voltage underscaling not only depends on the architecture of the underlying FPGA, but also, it can significantly vary for different FPGAs of a same platform as the result of the process variation.
C. Fault Characterization Through FPGA BRAMs Undervolting Below V min
In this section, we comprehensively characterize the behavior of undervolting faults, where V CCBRAM is underscaled from V min to V crash . Understanding this behavior is useful to deploy efficient mitigation techniques and in turn, take further advantage of power savings through undervolting. These experimental findings are used in the case study application in Section III.
1) The Impact of Data Pattern: We repeat experiments with different data patterns as the initial content of BRAMs and observe that the vast majority of undervolting faults are "1" to "0" bit-flips. This type of bit-flips is measured to be on average 99.9% for studied platforms. In other words, the fault rate is proportional to the number of "1" bits; for example, with pattern= 16'hFFFF the fault rate is almost double than pattern= 16'hAAAA, and with pattern= 16'h0000 only few faults manifest, as shown in Fig. 4 for VC707. In the same line, we did not observe any meaningful correlation when permutations with the same number of "0"s and "1"s are used in the input data pattern. For instance, as can be seen, the fault rate of patterns= 16'hAAAA, 16'h5555, and a random pattern composed of 50% of "0"s and 50% of "1"s are almost the same. Considering the behavior as mentioned above, we present the rest of results in this section, for the data pattern= 16'hFFFF, which corresponds to the highest fault rate among the tested input patterns.
2) Stability of Fault Over Time: As earlier mentioned, we repeat each test, i.e., consecutively reading the content of BRAMs under low-voltage operation, 100 times to get statistically significant results. We observe that the fault rate and location for different runs do not significantly change. For instance, average, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation of fault rate of these 100 runs at V min are summarized in TABLE II. As seen, the difference between various runs is negligible. Consequently, undervolting faults show a stable and deterministic behavior over time.
3) Fault Variability among BRAMs: By statistically analyzing the experimental results, we observe that faults are not uniformly distributed over different BRAMs. Also, common for all platforms, we observe that a significant percentage of BRAMs, e.g., 38 .9% in VC707 never experience faults even at the lowest voltage level at V crash = 0.54V . For instance, on VC707 when V CCBRAM = V crash = 0.54V , the maximum, minimum, and average fault rate within BRAMs are 2.84%, 0%, and 0.04%, respectively. For further analysis, we clustered this statistical information in low-, mid-, and high-vulnerable classes of BRAMs, using the k-means clustering algorithm. For all platforms, a vast majority of BRAMs are clustered as low-vulnerable. For instance, we show detailed results of VC707 in Fig. 5 . As can be seen, 88.6% of BRAMs are recognized as low-vulnerable with an average fault rate of 0.02%, ∼ 3.4 faults within an individual BRAM with the size of 16-kbits. This significant fault variability among BRAMs can be due to either the chip-dependent process variation or uncer- tainties of the design tools for place and route. We verify this argument by performing the following test; for our test design, we extracted the fault rate and location in different BRAMs with several place-and-route compilations. Repeating the voltage underscaling operation on these various bitstreams, we observe almost an identical fault rate and locations in the corresponding physical locations of BRAMs. Hence, we conclude this fault variability among BRAMs is the result of the within-die process variation. According to this test and also the deterministic behavior of faults, as earlier explained, we construct a chip-dependent Fault Variation Map (FVM). FVM is extracted by mapping the observed fault rates to the physical location of BRAMs on the tested chips. Through Vivado, we extract the required information to build FVM, including the floorplan of the chip and the placement information of BRAMs. For instance, FVM of VC707 is shown in Fig. 6 , when V CCBRAM is underscaled from V min = 0.61V to V crash = 0.54V by gradually voltage undercaling by 10 mV steps.
4) Impact of Die-to-Die Process Variation:
We perform a further analysis of understanding the effect of voltage scaling on two identical samples of the same platform, i.e. KC705-A and KC705-B, which can show the impact of the die-todie process variation. As earlier noted, KC705-A shows a relatively higher fault rate. Furthermore, with extracting their FVMs, we observe a significant difference in the fault map among BRAMs, Fig 7 that shows FVM of these platforms at V crash . For instance, BRAM#(116,1) has high-vulnerability in KC705-A; however, it has low-vulnerability in KC705-B. The consequence is the significant impact of the die-to-die process variation in the reliability behavior of FPGA BRAMs under aggressively reduced voltage levels.
D. Impact of the Environmental Temperature
We perform an experiment to study the effect of the environmental temperature on the behavior of faults when V CCBRAM is lowered below V min . Toward this goal, we place the hardware board inside a heat chamber where we regulate the temperature. We monitor the on-board temperature using PMBus commands. Through experiments, BRAMs fault rates are extracted and shown in Fig. 8 under the on-board temperatures of 50
• C (default temperature), 60
• C, 70
• C, and 80
• C. As can be seen, with heating up, the fault rate constantly reduces; for instance, by more than 3X in VC707, with the temperature is increased from 50
• C to 80 • C. This phenomenon is the con- sequence of the Inverse Thermal Independence (ITD) property [22] . ITD is a thermal property of digital devices with nanoscale technology nodes; and states that under ultra low-voltage operations, the circuit delay reduces at higher temperatures.
The reason is that as the technology node scales down, the supply voltage approaches the threshold voltage. Hence, at low-voltage regimes, increasing the temperature reduces the threshold voltage and allows the device to switch faster. In turn, with the circuit delay decreasing, the number of critical paths, and subsequently, the fault rate reduces. This property is experimentally verified in our case, for commercial FPGAs. Also, as can be seen, the fault rate in VC707 is reduced more aggressively than KC705-A. A relatively 156% more fault rate in 50
• C is reduced to 11.6% less fault rate in 80
• C, for VC707 vs. KC705-A. The architectural and technological difference between these platforms can be the reason since their design goal is different, i.e., performance (VC707) vs. power (KC705-A). Also, by heating up, the fault rate is significantly lower for VC705-B than KC705-A, as the consequence of the process variation. 
III. FPGA-BASED NEURAL NETWORK (NN) ACCELERATION BASED-ON LOW-VOLTAGE BRAMS
In this section, we present and discuss results of our study on the impact of BRAMs undervolting in a typical FPGA-based NN accelerator. More specifically, our study includes the power consumption and NN accuracy trade-off, characterizing the NN accuracy under low-voltage BRAMs operations, and an effective application-aware fault mitigation technique for operating below V min . We perform our experiments on a fully-connected NN in the classification (classification/prediction/recognition) phase. The major results presented in this section are on the MNIST dataset [23] ; however, to show the generality of findings, we briefly discuss two other NN benchmarks, i.e., Forest [24] and Reuters [25] , as well. MNIST is an image recognition benchmark suite, working on black and white digitized handwritten digits, each image 784*8-bit pixels, the output infers the number from 0 to 9. This model is composed of input, hidden, and output layers, where all neurons of adjacent layers are fully connected to each other, as a simplified model is shown in Fig. 12a . The intensity of each connection is determined by weights, whose values are tuned in the training phase as an offline stage. The first layer is called input layer and contains one neuron for each component in the input vector (e.g., each pixel). The last layer is called output layer and contains one neuron for each component in the output vector (e.g., each output class). Between the input and output layers, there are hidden layers. Each neuron of the NN uses an activation function (typically logarithmic sigmoid) to quantize its output. Finally, in the output layer, a softmax function generates the final output of the NN. The softmax function determines the probability distribution of the input vector over all different possible outcomes.
A. Introducing the Experimental Setup of the NN Evaluating
Detailed specifications of our experimental setup are summarized in Table III . In our system architecture, weights of the NN are located inside BRAMs and 10000 input images of MNIST are being streamed through an off-chip DDR-3. The required calculation of the image classification, i.e., matrix multiplication and sigmoid function activation, are performed in parallel by leveraging DSPs and LUTs of the FPGA in a stream-fashion model. This is a typical setup for most of the FPGA-based NN accelerator, as surveyed in [14] . Note that to save the space we present results on VC707 since we reach to similar conclusions by repeating experiments on other FPGA platforms.
Our tested NN has a 6-layers topology, i.e., ({L i , i ∈ [0, 5]}), composed of one input, four hidden, and one output layer(s). These layers have 784, 1024, 512, 256, 128, and 10 neurons, respectively. Thus, there are five set of weights, i.e., ({Layer j , j ∈ [0, 4]}), where Layer j refers to the weight set between L j and L j+1 . This setting leads to ∼1.5 million weights, which fills more than 70.8% BRAMs in the FPGA of VC707. Note that this size of weights exceeds the available BRAMs of other studied platforms; thus, for them we dynamically reload weights to BRAMs from DDR-3. The maximum operating frequency of our design is 100Mhz and the area utilization is summarized as 58.3%, 13.1%, and 43.1% for DSP, FF, and LUT, respectively.
The training phase of the NN is performed off-line using 60000 training images of MNIST, by a MATLAB implementation. Then, we export weights and biases of the trained NN, initialize BRAMs with these parameters, and repeat the classification of 10000 images at various levels of V CCBRAM . Also, for representing data, we use the fixed-point lowprecision model. Note that lowering the precision of data is a common technique for applications in the approximate computing domain, such as NN [26] and multimedia [27] , to achieve power and performance efficiency with negligible accuracy loss. Following these studies, we use per-layer minimum precision fixed-point model. The bit-width of weights is fixed to 16-bits, composed of the sign, digit, and fraction components. Toward this goal, with a pre-processing analysis, we extract the minimum bit-widths of the sign and digit components per layer, and the rest of 16-bits are exploited as fraction components. As can be seen in Fig. 9 , except the last layer, i.e., Layer 4 , weights of other layers are in (-1, 1) margin, which means that there is no need for the digit component. However, for the Layer 4 , a 4-bit digit component is used, i.e., the minimum width to represent data without any NN accuracy loss.
On this setup, the total on-chip power consumption breakdown at various V CCBRAM s, i.e., V nom = 1V , V min = 0.61V , and V crash = 0.54V , is shown in Fig. 10 . As can be seen, more than an order of magnitude BRAM power dissipation reduction is achieved by underscaling V CCBRAM from V nom = 1V to the guardband gap on V min = 0.61V , which in turn, delivers 24.1% total on-chip power reduction. Further voltage underscaling to V crash = 0.54V , reduces a further 40% of BRAM power over V min = 0.61V ; however, as a result of the timing faults, the NN classification error is in turn impacted. This impact and the proposed fault mitigation technique are discussed later in this section.
B. The Impact of BRAMs Undervolting Below V min
When V CCBRAM is underscaled in the critical region between V min = 0.61V until V crash = 0.54V , faults occurring in some of bitcells degrades the NN accuracy. Hence, the classification error is increased from 2.56% (inherent classification error without any fault) to 6.15% when V CCBRAM = V crash = 0.54V , see Fig. 11 . The NN classification error (left y-axis) increases exponentially, correlated directly with the fault rate increase in BRAMs (right y-axis), as expected. Also, we observe that the fault rate in BRAMs filled with the NN weights is significantly less than the default pattern= 16h'FFFF as earlier shown in Fig. 3a . The reason is that 76.3% of the studied NN weight bits having the logic value "0". These bits have a negligible probability to be flipped, considering that most of the undervolting faults are "1" to "0" bit-flips; thus, it can be concluded that MNIST is inherently fault-tolerant against undervolting faults. Through an statistical experimentation, we confirm this data sparsity for other NN benchmarks such as Forest and Reuters. Also, other state-ofthe-art works have already confirmed the sparsity of many NN benchmarks [28] , [29] , and a wider range of other applications, as well [30] . It means these applications would be inherently fault-tolerant for the type of failures experienced through FPGA BRAM undervolting.
C. Fault Mitigation Technique
To prevent the NN accuracy loss under low-voltage FPGA BRAM operations, we propose an efficient technique that we term Intelligently-Constrained BRAM Placement (ICBP). The overall methodology of ICBP, as an additional patch for BRAMs placement stage, is shown in Fig. 12b . It relies on our two key observations:
• 1 As detailed in Section II, we observed that faults occur in reduced voltage BRAMs have deterministic and chip-dependent behavior with a fully non-uniform distribution between different BRAMs that is exposed as FVM. As earlier mentioned, FVM extraction is a preprocess stage.
• 2 We observed that various layers of the given NN have different inherent vulnerability to faults. We conducted a pre-processing analysis and observed that inner layers (layers closer to the output) are relatively more vulnerable, as similarly observed in [31] , [32] , [33] , since faults in these layers have relatively less probability to be masked through the quantification in the activation functions. The sensitivity of NN layers, i.e., {Layer j , j ∈ [0, 4]} is evaluated by injecting simulated randomlygenerated faults in corresponding weights of individual layers at the Register-Transfer Level (RTL). In other words, we inject a number of random faults in weights of individual NN layers and let the NN to accomplish the classification. By monitoring the classification error of the faulty NN, we can evaluate the vulnerability of each NN level.
For further analysis, we present detailed statistical information of the different layers of the given NN in Fig. 13 , i.e., the size (in terms of utilized number of BRAMs to locate weights of the corresponding NN layer), number of undervolting faults that we observed in our experiments, and the normalized vulnerability of the individual layers as we performed as a pre-process study. As can be seen, for instance the output/last layer, i.e., Layer 4 is 6X more vulnerable than the input/first layer, i.e., Layer 0 , which means that the same rate of faults injected in Layer 4 causes 6X NN classification error than injecting the same number of faults in Layer 0 . Also, outer layers (closer to the input layer) are relatively larger, which can potentially experience more faults.
Due to these observations, ICPB introduces a simple yet effective BRAMs placement algorithm that maps the weights of the last NN layer to low-vulnerable BRAMs, targeting to mitigate faults and achieve power-savings with minimized NN classification accuracy loss. In other words, ICBP proposes additional constraints for the placement algorithm during the FPGA compiling process. To apply intelligent constraint on the BRAMs placement, we exploit the Physical Blocks (Pblocks) facility [34] of Vivado. Pblocks provides a facility to constrain logical blocks, e.g., BRAMs, to a physical region in the FPGA. Hence, we force the tool at the placement stage to locate logical BRAMs including the weights of the last NN layer, i.e., Layer 4 , into those BRAMs that are tagged as low-vulnerable. As earlier detailed, the last NN layer is the smallest; however, the most-sensitive against faults; thus, it has the most priority to be protected. The time slack overhead of this technique is negligible since a very small number of BRAMs in the last NN layer, i.e., two BRAMs, are constrained to exploit the lowvulnerable BRAMs. Consequently, as can be seen in Fig. 14 for VC707, on average 38.1% power savings is achieved at V crash = 0.54V over V min = 0.61V , by 0.6% NN accuracy loss from the inherent fault-free classification error of 2.56% for MNIST; however, the same amount of power in the default placement is dissipated by more than 3.59% NN accuracy loss. Also, we repeat the similar methodology for Forest and Reuters benchmarks and as can be seen in Fig. 14b and Fig.  14c , undervolting faults are significantly covered, which in turn, leads to prevention of the NN accuracy loss for them, as well. Among studied benchmarks, Reuters is less sparse; thus, undervolting faults more significantly impacts the NN accuracy loss; however, mostly covered by ICBP.
IV. RELATED WORK
In comparison to traditional general-purpose CPU-based systems, hardware accelerators provide better power, performance, and energy efficiency in various domains such as database processing [35] , [36] , [37] , speech recognition [38] , [39] , [40] , and neural network applications [14] , [41] . However, with the rise of the size of data, energy consumption is still a key concern. As an effective architecture-level energy saving mechanism, aggressive undervolting has recently brought attention, which is summarized in this section.
A. Aggressive Undervolting Technique on Real Hardware
Aggressive undervolting as an efficient technique to optimize the energy efficiency, has been recently studied for several commercial/customized hardware devices, which are summarized below. However, to the best of our knowledge, such a comprehensive study on commercial FPGAs has not been undertaken yet.
1) Voltage Guardband: Most commercial devices are designed with a voltage guardband below the standard nominal supply voltage to ensure the correct functionality in the worst case environmental conditions and process variations. This voltage guardband is fully vendor-and system-dependent; for instance, it was measured to be 20%, 16% , and 12% of the nominal voltage level in modern GPUs [7] , DRAMs [9] , and CPUs [18] , respectively. We confirm a large voltage guardband for Xilinx FPGAs, which is experimentally measured to be on average of 39%. This gap provides an opportunity to decrease the supply voltage until V min without any reliability degradation, in our case delivering more than an order of magnitude power savings.
2) Simultaneous Voltage and Frequency Underscaling: Further voltage underscaling below the voltage guardband gap, i.e., V min , impacts the timing and increases the delay, which can in turn, cause fault occurring. In this regard, the simultaneous frequency underscaling, i.e., DVFS is a common approach to prevent these faults. The DVFS mechanism guarantees that the design works as close to, but always above, the critical operating point, the point where further underscaling frequency or voltage will result in observable faults [42] . A recent DVFS mechanism implemented on FPGAs, [43] , showed 70% energy savings. However, the impediment of DVFS is the performance degradation as a result of the frequency lowering, which in turn, can potentially limits the energy efficiency and thus, applicability of this approach for power-hungry scenarios such as mobile environments. DVFS is not targeted in our paper.
3) Aggressive Undervolting into Critical Regions: Tackling with the increased delay in low-voltage regions below V min , a more aggressive approach is to allow designs to experience timing faults and in turn, effectively tolerating faults. Characterizing and mitigating these faults can allow better power and reliability trade-offs, without significant performance degradation as is for DVFS approach. Due to the advantageous as mentioned for this approach, many recent studies have been conducted to evaluate the efficiency of aggressive undervolting on different hardware devices as summarized as follows. Our paper studies extends this studies for the first time to commercial FPGAs.
• Modern Processors: There are multiple studies on the voltage lowering below V min in modern processors. For instance, [2] revisited the microarchitecture of the processor design to be adaptable in the critical voltage regions to minimize the voltage at which a soft architecture encounters the maximum allowable fault rate, and [3] presented a methodology for reliability-aware design space exploration. [4] extends aggressive undervolting to multi-core CPUs and [18] leveraged built-in ErrorCorrecting Code (ECC) technique to detect and mitigate faults in Intel Itanium II.
• GPUs: As an example of commercial GPUs, [44] studied this approach in GPU register files and proposed an architectural solution that leverages long register dead time to enable reliable operations from unreliable register file at low voltages.
• ASICs: As an example of ASICs, [45] evaluated the Floating Point Units (FPUs) under timing violations and accordingly, presented a bit-level fault model. • Memory Systems: Along with processing units, the storage modules are also studied for very low voltage operation. For instance, [9] comprehensively studied the modern DRAM chips from various vendors. They analyzed its impacts on the DRAM's access latency and reliability, by characterizing the behavior of faults and presenting effective mitigation techniques. In the same line, [10] and its later version [46] evaluated the effect of supply voltage scaling in SRAMs that they specifically fabricated. It is reported that the supply voltage reduction of 310mV could save 2.9X of power consumption. In parallel, there are several industrial/reseach projects running in this area [47] , [48] , [49] .
4) Mitigation of Undervolting Faults:
To detect and/or mitigate faults several general techniques are proposed in different domains such as Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) [50] , Razor [51] , [52] , ECC using Hamming code [53] , Hardware Transnational Memory (HTM) [54] , frequency underscaling [12] , among others. These techniques can be potentially customized to detect and/or mitigate timing faults in low-voltage regions, as well; however, with timing, area, or power costs. In this paper, instead of these costly operations we performed our study to comprehensively understand the behavior of faults under low-voltage operations and accordingly, develop application-dependent efficient mitigation technique, which has negligible timing/power/area overhead.
B. Recent Related Studies on NNs
NNs are inherently power-hungry applications, due to the computations, storages, and data movements requirement for the large matrices. Addressing this concern, several application-level power-optimization techniques are proposed such as low-precision data representation model [26] , node pruning [55] , data compressing [56] , among others. These techniques are customized for different underlying platforms such as CPUs, GPUs, FPGAs, and ASICs, as in detail surveyed in [57] . Alternatively, as an architecture-level power-savings technique, voltage underscaling of the underlying hardware is a promising approach. Since it has been shown that NNs are inherently resilient and can tolerate with quite high fault rates [58] , [59] , [32] , aggressive undervolting can lead to significant energy savings. Below, we summarize recent works on the voltage scaling and the subsequent resilience studies, i.e., fault characterization and/or mitigation for NNs. The vast majority of works are simulations-based; however, there are a few efforts on real hardware, as well.
1) Simulation-Based Resilience Study of NNs Under Voltage Scaling:
A vast majority of existing efforts on the NNs fault tolerance study is based on either fault injection in the software level or theoretical analysis, as surveyed in [58] . More specifically, aggressively voltage underscaling has been recently studied mostly on ASIC-based NN accelerators. For instance, Minerva proposed an automated co-design approach across the algorithm, architecture, and circuit levels to optimize ASIC accelerators of fully-connected NN using SPICE simulations for low-voltage SRAMs [28] . As another recent effort, ThUnderVolt is proposed as a framework to enable the voltage scaling study on ASIC-based Deep NN (DNN) accelerators; however, they modeled timing faults via postsynthesis gate-level simulations in ModelSim [60] . Ares [61] is a framework for quantifying the resilience of deep neural networks. Also, [31] studied an RTL model of the NN from resilience perspective by injecting faults in the registers of the design. Also, recently [33] studied the fault propagation in an ASIC model of NN focused on the vulnerability of different NN layers. [62] analyzes and mitigates the impact of permanent faults on a systolic array based neural network accelerator by an Spice model on Google TPU [63] . In the same line, [64] presents an in-memory NN classifier in standard SRAM array and performs the subsequent fault study under low voltage operations; however, by a Monte Carlo simulations. It is appear that this approach lacks the exact information of the fault model and thus, their validation on the silicon remains a key question.
2) Real Hardware-Based Resilience Study of NNs Under Voltage Scaling:
There are limited publicly-available works on the low-voltage NNs on real-hardware; however, there are some efforts for ASICs and SRAMs, as summarized below:
-ASICs: There are several energy-efficient fabricated ASICs for NNs, e.g., Google TPU [63] , Eyeriss [65] , YodaNN [66] , and [8] . However, only [8] has briefly studied the behavior of NN below nominal level scaling beyond V min , where timing faults manifest. They fabricated a 28nm SOC with a programmable accelerator design for fully-connected NN, where a Razor circuit is used to detect timing faults in the datapath under aggressively reduced supply voltages. However, this paper is targeted for ASICs and also, does not propose a detailed fault characterization study on NNs.
-SRAMs: [10] , [46] proposed a partially silicon-validated NN study on aggressively reduced voltage on SRAMs. In other words, they fabricated an 8KB SRAM with 28nm technology and evaluated the resilience of NN, while input images are located on the reduced-voltage SRAM. However, it is suffering from several limitations, e.g., i) without detailed bit-level characterization, ii) this study is on only input data (not weights), and iii) a software-level NN is used, which does not allow to apply any mitigation technique on the datapath of NN on the silicon. Also, tests are performed on a specialized SRAM cells, not on standard SRAM library cell, which makes it difficult to expand results of this paper for real accelerators.
3) The Key Novelty of our Paper Related to NN Study: FPGAs are attractive devices to accelerate NN since they represent an intermediate point between the power and performance efficiency of ASICs and the programmability of CPUs and GPUs [67] , [68] , [69] , [70] . One of the key components of FPGAs that directly impacts the performance of FPGAbased NNs is built-in BRAMs, due to the high-demand of NN computations for the parallel data access, as described in detail for recent FPGA-based accelerators in this survey paper [14] . Motivated by these studies, we evaluated the BRAMs voltage scaling impacts on the power and accuracy trade-offs of FPGA-based NN accelerator. We push a typical FPGAbased NN to work in low-voltage regimes to take advantage of the power savings, targeted for FPGAs. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first effort to perform such aggressive voltage scaling study of commercial FPGAs, while running an NN application. In addition, we proposed a novel and efficient fault mitigation technique that relies on the behavior of undervolting faults.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper experimentally evaluated the supply voltage underscaling below the nominal level in commercial FPGAs. We discovered that there is a significant voltage guardband gap, where data can be safely retrieved from BRAMs. However, by further undervolting observable faults occur, as a result of the timing delay increase. We extensively characterized the behavior of these faults, more specifically for on-chip memories of FPGAs. Finally, we evaluated the impact of the undervolting in the accuracy and power of an FPGA-based NN accelerator in the inference phase. To attain the power efficiency without NN accuracy loss, we proposed an efficient application-aware BRAM placement algorithm that relies on the behavior of undervolting faults. As an ongoing work, we are working on a more comprehensive voltage scaling in other components of commercial FPGAs and on different FPGA technologies of vendors.
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